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ARangeland Grasshopper Insurance Program
Melvin  D. Skold and Robert M. Davis
The  incidence  of benefits  and  costs from  controlling  rangeland  grasshoppers  on  public
grazing  lands  poses  problems  of economic  efficiency  and  distributional  equity.  Public
grasshopper control programs operate like public disaster assistance. However, grasshopper
infestations  are an insurable  risk. This article proposes  a rangeland grasshopper  insurance
program  which  reduces  the economic  inefficiencies  and  distributional  inequities  of the
existing program.
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Introduction
Since the devastating outbreak of migratory grasshoppers in the 1930s, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) has been involved with controlling grasshopper and Mormon cricket
infestations on public rangelands. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection  Service (APHIS)
cooperative  management  programs  were  established  by  the  Incipient  and  Emergency
Control  of Pests  Act  of  1937  and  have  continued  through  a  succession  of legislation,
including the Food, Agriculture,  Conservation and Trade Act of 1990. Direct involvement
of APHIS  is limited to public  rangelands along with intermingled private lands and/or the
treatment  of grasshoppers  on  public  rangelands that pose  a threat to adjacent  crops.  The
agency also offers technical  assistance to state agencies and private individuals on control
of grasshoppers on croplands (USDA 1987).
This article addresses problems regarding the incidence of benefits and costs which are
inherent in the current rangeland  grasshopper control program. The economic inefficiency
and distributional inequities present in the existing program  are demonstrated. A rangeland
grasshopper insurance program is proposed to reduce the inefficiencies and inequities of the
current program.
Rangeland reform and proposed reductions in federal agricultural and resource protection
programs  require  rejustification  of all  public  expenditures.  Programs  must not only  be
cost-effective, but they must also be justified as being in the public interest. The continuation
of grasshopper control programs has been questioned for economic as well as environmental
reasons (USDA 1987).
To date, publically assisted rangeland grasshopper  control programs have operated like
disaster  programs.  This  article  proposes  a  new method  of financing  publically  assisted
rangeland  grasshopper  control programs.  Financing these programs  by insurance,  as pro-
posed here, will better match program costs to those who benefit from the program.
Inefficiencies and inequities of the existing program are demonstrated by using a decision
support  system  developed  by  the  Grasshopper  Integrated  Pest  Management  (GHIPM)
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project (Davis  et al.).  The decision  support system, called  Hopper,  is a  simulation model
based on important physical, biological, and economic parameters.
Public Control Programs
Initial justification  for public  involvement  in grasshopper  control programs  was based on
(a) the inability of any one individual to conduct an independently effective control program,
(b) the lack of cost-effectiveness of collective efforts to control grasshoppers and associated
"free-rider"  problems,  and (c)  protection of the range and soil resource  base from damage
and destruction  by an infestation of grasshoppers.  Rationale  for public  involvement also
included  (d)  the  expected  prevention  of the  spread  of grasshoppers  to  other  lands  in
subsequent years (Pfadt and Hardy;  Smith; Wakeland).  Furthermore,  (e) during the  1930s
grasshoppers warming themselves  on railroad tracks actually disrupted  commerce and (f)
likely contributed to the massive dislocation of farmers and ranchers. Some  earlier perceived
public benefits of grasshopper  control are not widely accepted, nor are the threats a serious
concern today; however, the potential damage grasshoppers can inflict on a rangeland is still
very real.  Grasshoppers can damage a range  as severely as overgrazing.  Range renovation
and reclamation costs can be sizable and may require many years to complete. However, an
outbreak and decline of a grasshopper population  is not predictable;  some researchers  have
applied chaos theory to their incidence (Lockwood and Lockwood).
Even though public benefits were an important part of the historical rationale for public
involvement in rangeland grasshopper control programs, current decisions to initiate control
programs  are based solely on perceived private benefits.
In the early 1930s an economic injury level for grasshopper densities was adopted to help
decide when treatments  should be applied (Parker).  The  intervention level of eight  grass-
hoppers per square yard (8 GH/YD ) has been applied for over 50 years.
An average of over two million acres per year have been treated over the past two decades.
The most recent major outbreak of grasshoppers occurred in 1985 when almost  14 million
acres were treated (table  1). Approximately equal amounts of private and public lands have
been treated, primarily in the  17 western states (USDA 1987). Congress appropriates  funds
to APHIS depending on the expected requirements for grasshopper control.  APHIS obliga-
tions vary with the proportions of  public and private land involved. Thus, APHIS obligations
in any one year do not directly correspond to the area treated.
APHIS pays the full cost of treating federal rangelands, one-half of the cost of treating
state-owned  lands,  and  one-third  of the  cost  of treating private  lands.  The  cost-sharing
arrangement can lead to conflicts. 2The analysis presented here assumes no state participation
in  the  control  program.  Since  actions  to  reduce  the  grasshopper  population  occur  at  a
relatively small cost to ranchers  leasing federal rangelands,  they are  very  sensitive to the
presence of grasshoppers.  The grasshopper control program philosophy is that when ranch-
ers lease public rangelands,  they are, in fact, leasing a given amount of forage.  Davis et al.
(1992)  have  shown  how the  universally  applied  discrete-choice  intervention  level  of 8
GH/YD  does  not recognize  factors  important  to  the  economic justification  for  control
ISurveys  determine  the annual  presence  of grasshoppers.  Unused  funds appropriated  for  treatment  are carried  over to a
subsequent year.
2Some states also enter into cost-sharing programs;  others do not. If states do participate,  they typically pay one-third of the
costs.  Ranchers in states without cost-sharing  arrangements have to bear two-thirds of the treatment costs on private lands.
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Table 1.  Acres of Land Treated for Grasshoppers and Morman Crickets and
APHIS,  USDA Obligations,  1972-91
Treated Acres  APHIS Obligations
Year  (1,000)  ($1,000)
1972  2,205  1,146
1973  3,087  2,176
1974  3,000  1,563
1975  677  988
1976  983  2,696
1977  1,408  2,003
1978  816  1,471
1979  7,200  5,469
1980  5,215  6,040
1981  1,300  3,393
1982  600  1,927
1983  0  1,613
1984  216  1,539
1985  13,800  21,700
1986  6,858  11700
1987  1,360  3,800
1988  513  92
1989  109  315
1990  260  1,218
1991  200  687
Source: USDA administrative data,  1992.
programs.  If an  economic  threshold  as  defined  by  economists  is  applied  (Stem  et  al.;
Headley),  economic justification  is  shown to depend  upon a number  of factors  including
inherent rangeland productivity,  precipitation-affected  forage  output from rangelands,  the
opportunity cost of forage, and the cost and efficacy of treatments (Davis et al.).
Welfare Considerations
Public  cost-sharing  programs  pose  issues  which  involve  both  of the  principal  tenets of
welfare  economic  analysis:  allocative  efficiency  and  distributional  equity  (Haveman an d
Weisbrod).  Allocative  inefficiency  exists  because  of a  disassociation  between  costs  and
benefits  of the  control  programs  between  public  and  private  land  owners.  The  costs  of
grasshopper control on federal grazing land are borne entirely by APHIS, and the costs of
control on state lands are  shared equally between APHIS  and a participating state agency.
The rancher  incurs no  costs  for grasshopper  abatement on public land.  The rancher  does
become financially involved in the  costs of control on private land; then, two-thirds of the
control program costs are paid by the rancher, the balance being paid by the public agencies
involved.
Distributional  equity problems  are evident when comparing two ranches with different
proportions of public and private land. Ranchers with greater proportions of their total land
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base, animal unit months (AUMs), coming from public land have much smaller cost shares
than  do  ranchers  with proportionately  more private  land.  Treatments  generally  occur  in
blocks,  often blocks of 100,000 acres  involving ranchers  with varied cost shares. While all
ranchers  benefit from the public program,  they share disproportionately  in both treatment
costs and the benefits they receive.
Modeling Different Land Ownership Patterns
Hopper links three models to simulate the range forage-grasshopper-ranch  system (Davis et
al.).  One model,  RangeMod,  simulates range  forage  in response to a  set of physical  and
biological  conditions  (Berry and  Hanson).  A  second  model,  HopMod,  is  a grasshopper
population  dynamics  model  based  on  the  observed  responses  of alternative  species  of
grasshoppers  in  rangeland  and  laboratory  environments  (Berry,  Kemp,  and  Onsager).
Interaction  of RangeMod  and HopMod provides estimates  of forage destruction by grass-
hoppers. The remaining forage available from a specified grasshopper density and treatment
becomes input into the third model component, RanchMod. RanchMod  is a linear program-
ming model  for a  typical ranch  in the  study area.  As  less forage  is  available,  RanchMod
determines the least-cost alternative  source of forage to sustain the livestock herd.
Allocative  efficiency  and distributional  equity principles are illustrated by considering
two  northern  plains  ranches  with  different  proportions  of public  and private  land.  The
ranches are identical in all ways except in their proportions of public land and private land
grazing: ranch A has mostly public  land and ranch B has mostly private land. The grazing
season begins  1 April  and continues  through  31  December.  Either hay feeding  or private
land grazing sustains the livestock from January through March.
Each ranch has a 480-head cow herd; a complement of bulls and replacement heifers use
the same forage resources as the cows. A total of 16,044 acres of grazing land and 300 acres
of hay land supports the livestock herd. Each ranch has 502 acres of state grazing land. Ranch
A has  12,913  acres of leased federal  grazing land  and 2,629 acres of private grazing land.
Ranch B has only 2,629 acres of leased federal land but has  12,913 acres of private land.
Treatments  based on the economic  threshold using Hopper  compare  expected private
benefits  to the expected total cost of applying a grasshopper treatment. Private benefits are
calculated as damages  abated (Headley;  Davis  et al.).  The difference  in ranch net returns
between the treatment and no-treatment case, for a given grasshopper density and treatment
alternative,  is the measure  of damages  abated.3
Distributional  Equity
Given the cost-sharing  arrangements  of the grasshopper control  program, the two ranches
with their differing proportions of public-to-private land face markedly different cost shares
when the treatments  are applied.  Shown in figure 1  are the costs to the rancher and state and
federal  agencies  for  the  most  cost  effective  of the  treatments.  At  a  treatment  cost of
$2.25/acre, total cost to treat the 16,044-acre ranch is $36,099.
3Benefit-cost (B/C) ratios of incremental  costs and benefits are applied since public land management agencies  are familiar
with  this criterion.  In  this case, the  B/C criteria and net present  value criteria  are  identical.  Only current  year benefits  are
evaluated.  Between project comparisons  are not relevant since the decision  is only one of applying or not-applying treatments.
Special no-year  funds are appropriated  for grasshopper control.  Cases could arise in which  funds available  are not sufficient
to treat all financially justified (B/C  =  1.0) conditions. If allocations must  occur, they should attempt to equate the B/C ratios
between  the various treatment areas.
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Rancher Costs State Agency Costs Federal Costs
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Figure 1.  Share of treatment costs paid by federal and state governments and ranchers for
ranches with different proportions of public and private land
Ranch A pays only $3,944 for treating, which is two-thirds of the cost of treating the 20%
private grazing land. The state pays $565,  one-half the cost of treating state land, and APHIS
pays one-third the cost of treating private land, one-half the cost of treating state land, and
all of the treatment cost on federal land, for a total of $31,590.4
Ranch B pays $19,369,  which is two-thirds of the cost of treating the private land. The
state's  cost  share  is  the  same  while  the  federal  cost  share  is  $16,165.  Clearly,  some
distributional  inequities  are present when two  otherwise identical  ranches  have  different
proportions of public and private grazing land in their ranch operations.5
Allocative Efficiency
The federal agency incurs markedly different costs for the two ranches:  more public land is
present  on ranch  A,  thus,  federal  agency  costs  are  also  much  greater.  Additionally,  the
measured private benefits  are slightly different. Ranch A has greater direct costs for leasing
public land.  On ranch B, which has more owned land, higher net returns above direct costs
4Environmental  conditions  often  dictate  the choice  of treatments.  One  approved  biological  control  is available,  Nosema
locustae. In general,  sprays are less costly  to apply to  large areas, and if physical and biological conditions are right, they are
quite efficacious. If environmental conditions permit use, malathion spray is the most cost-effective for the conditions simulated
by Davis et al. (  1992).
5It is possible that a ranch's benefits from publicly supported grasshopper controls could become capitalized into the ranch's
value. This would add to the inequity problem. However, a treatment costing $2.85 per acre, recurring,  at most, once every five
to eight years, would hardly be noticeable  in a capitalization  evaluation.
U
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are realized due to a much larger private asset base. Damages abated, as measured by private
benefits, are slightly greater for ranch B than they are for ranch A since ranch A incurs larger
cash costs for leasing more public land.
As seen in figure  1, ranch A will be  willing to initiate grasshopper control programs at
the density which results in $3,944 of damage. Ranch B would apply controls with a density
which produces  a damage  of $19,369.  To  offset  its  costs  the federal  government would
require damages of $31,590 and $16,165  on ranches Aand B, respectively.  The state has still
a different grasshopper density economic threshold.
Existing cost-sharing arrangements make  ranchers of both ranch A and B want to apply
grasshopper  treatments  at  relatively  low densities.  The  state would  also  favor  applying
treatments at relatively low grasshopper densities. The federal agency is expected to initiate
controls  whenever  private benefits  are  estimated to exceed  total treatment  costs. Because
blocks  of acres  are  treated,  the  varied  ownership  proportions  are  not  factored  into  the
treatment decision. Nevertheless,  inequities and inefficiencies  are inherent.
Alleged  Public Benefits
Public involvement was justified for a number of reasons mentioned above. 6 Though aside
from the presence of endangered species which prohibits chemical treatments, the presence
of water in the treatment area which limits the choice of chemical treatments, or the existence
of commercial  bee operations  which are removed from treatment sites, public benefits  are
not recognized by the existing program.
Both knowledge about grasshopper population dynamics and the technology for control
have changed  since public  rangeland  grasshopper control  programs were  initiated during
the  1930s.  Today,  approved programs  include four chemical methods  and one biological
control method. The treatments used today are much more effective, and modem techniques
(e.g.,  aerial spraying, effective  chemicals) enable rapid treatment of large areas.
Important economic inefficiencies  and inequalities arise due to disassociations between
beneficiaries  of publicly  supported  grasshopper  control  programs  and the  costs of those
programs. Any effort to assign costs more directly to the beneficiaries would improve both
efficiency and  equity (Heady,  ch.  20). Both ranchers  with differing proportions of public
land  enjoy benefits  from the  control programs;  however,  the more public  land a rancher
leases, the more he/she stands to benefit.
A Grasshopper Insurance Program
The  occurrence  of grasshoppers  on  public  rangelands  in  the  western  U.S.  has  all  the
characteristics of an insurable risk.  Statistical probabilities  of an economically  damaging
outbreak at a given site can be established from APHIS surveys and records of participation
in spray programs.  There  are a  large number of cases with limited  liability and a clearly
identifiable  loss.  Events  are randomly  repeated  over  time  and  space  and  are  generally
considered to be independent  (Heady, ch.  15; Miller and Walter). APHIS maintains records
Entomologists  differ about  the threat  of grasshopper  outbreaks  spreading  and  continuing  in  subsequent years  (Pfadt and
Hardy;  Hewitt and Onsager;  Blickenstaff,  Skoog, and Daum).  In the case of rangeland  grasshoppers,  financial justification  is
expected  exclusively from  the treated area. Only when rangelands  are treated to protect adjacent croplands  are the benefits of
a control  program ascribed  to adjoining lands.
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which  detail the areas  treated,  including  costs of application,  treatments  applied,  cost of
materials, and the ancillary costs associated with the treatments. When an outbreak occurs
in a particular area,  it tends to be irregular.  Some lands may experience  extremely  heavy
infestations while neighboring lands have only light infestations.
The between-year  variation  in acres  treated is large  (table  1).  At any one location and
year, the likelihood of finding grasshopper densities in excess of the economic threshold  is
small. Yet, when infestations do occur, the financial impacts are  so great as to threaten the
economic  survival of the affected ranches. The average cost for all rangeland grasshopper
control programs in  1989 and  1990 was $2.85 per acre (USDA  1991); costs are bid as cost
per acre, including chemical  and application costs.
Grasshopper  Insurance
Given  the risk characteristics  of grasshopper  infestations  together with the actuarial  data
available  from APHIS  records, a  grasshopper  insurance program  would be possible. The
proposed insurance program would be mandatory. All ranchers who lease public land would
be required to purchase insurance on all comanaged rangeland included  in their operation;
they would incur an annual premium cost for grasshopper insurance. When a grasshopper
outbreak  which  meets  the  financially  defined  economic  threshold  for  treatment  occurs,
treatment would proceed at no cost to the rancher(s) affected. The treatment costs would be
borne by the insurance  fund into which ranchers pay annual premiums.
Federal agencies managed grazing on 258 million acres of range  and forest land in the
17 contiguous western states (USDA 1981). These public lands provided  19 million AUMs
of grazing in 1989 (USDA 1990; USDI). Grazed rangelands involve intermingling of federal,
state,  and private land, and they  are  generally managed  as  one unit. Grasshopper control
programs are most efficiently applied to contiguous blocks of land, regardless of ownership.
Insurance schemes would be applied to all land whether managed by federal or state agencies
or by private individuals and corporations.
Furthermore,  insurance  programs  would  have  to  be  mandatory  rather  than  optional.
Mandatory participation  is required because  all land in the infested block must be treated,
regardless of ownership. Unless mandatory, "free rider" tendencies would result:  an unin-
sured rancher could become a beneficiary to treatments applied to grasshoppers on adjacent
ranches.7 Also, important  economies  are realized  from treating blocks of land rather than
parcels which might result from an optional insurance program.
This insurance program is proposed as a way to protect ranchers and the range resource
from  devastating  infestations  of grasshoppers  while  making  the  publicly  supported  ran-
geland grasshopper program more financially sound. Initiating an insurance program would
reduce  the  economic  inefficiencies  and  inequities  associated  with  the existing  program.
Further, the proposed program will result in reduced use of chemicals to control grasshoppers
as  treatments  will  occur only  when  a  financial  (economic)  threshold  is  met  and  direct
beneficiaries of the treatment share proportionally  in the cost of treatment.
1It  is possible that  a ranch with  only private land could benefit as a  free rider if that ranch  is entirely surrounded  by public
land.  Such cases  are thought  to  be  rare. Similar insurance  programs could be applied  to  ranch  situations which  only  utilize
private  land, but such  is beyond the scope of this study. Applications could also be extended to control rangeland grasshoppers
for crop protection.
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Actuarial  Information
The existing program has an annual average cost of about $7.1 million. Of that total, about
$3.6 million is federal program costs; the remainder is borne by the private individuals and
state government.  Insurance would cost users of public grazing about $0.10/AUM per year
on all of their grazing land, public and private. Premiums could be based on acres or AUMs.
Control costs are directly proportional  to acres; the cost to treat a very productive  acre of
range is  the same  as the cost of treating a much  less productive acre. Basing premiums on
AUMs, however,  automatically adjusts premiums  based on rangeland productivity.  At the
same  time,  the  economic  justification  for  treatment  will  require  a  greater  density  of
grasshoppersperr  square  yard  on  less  productive  rangelands  than  on  more  productive
rangelands.  Basing premiums  on  AUMs achieves  greater  equity between  premiums  and
possible pay-outs than would  a cost per acre insurance scheme.
The premium of $0. 1 /AUM/year assumes the same coverage level as has been applied
in  the  past.  However,  if grasshopper  treatments  are  applied  only  when  the  economic
threshold is reached (rather than the universal guideline of 8 GH/YD ), it is quite likely that
less  land  would  be treated  than  in  the past.  Treating  less  land  would reduce  aggregate
expenditures  and per unit insurance premium costs.
For ranches using  public  grazing  land,  federal  land makes up  about 28%  of the total
rangeland  AUMs  (Gee  et  al.  1986a,  b).  Another 3% of AUMs  are  from  state  stlands; the
remaining 69%  of  rangeland AUMs are supplied from private lands, both leased and deeded.
Thus,  for  every AUM of federal  grazing  land, ranchers  obtain  2.46 AUMs  of rangeland
grazing from other sources. 8 In 1989, there were about 76.5 million AUMs of grazing used
by ranchers with public land grazing leases. The mandatory insurance program would apply
to these 76.5 million AUMs.
From  1972 to  1991  an average of 2.5 million  acres per year received treatment.  With a
recent-year average cost per acre treated of $2.85, the average yearly outlay has an expected
value of $7.1  million. Spread over 76.5 million AUMs, the average cost per AUM for insured
protection is $0.093. Publicly sponsored insurance programs, such as federal crop insurance,
generally  add  10%  to the premiums  for administrative  costs (Miller and Walter).  Adding
10%  to the cost per AUM, grasshopper insurance could be provided for western rangelands
at a cost of $0. 102/AUM.  Assuming an average of 13.5 acres per AUM, the annual per acre
cost of the  insurance program would be $0.0076.
The improvement in distributive equity can be demonstrated.  Suppose ranch A and ranch
B experience a grasshopper density sufficient to trigger control programs once in ten years.
Over the ten-year  period, each rancher would  have paid  an annual grasshopper  insurance
premium  of 16,044  acres  x $0.0076/ac.  =  $121.93,  or $1,219.30  for ten years.  Assume  a
grasshopper outbreak occurs which reaches the economic threshold density; at that density,
damages abated on each ranch are approximately $36,000. Since grasshopper insurance must
be purchased  on all grazing land (public and private) used by those leasing public land, the
benefits relative to the cost of insurance premiums would not greatly differ between the two
ranches with different proportions of public and private grazing land. Costs would be shared
in more direct proportion to benefits, improving  the distributional equity.
XTreatment  programs  average  about  50%  federal  land.  Because  the  existing  control  programs  involve  minimal  private
cost-share  for  treating  public lands,  it is reasonable  to expect  than  greater portions of public lands  are treated  than  the total
proportion  of public  lands in  the grazing lands.
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Since  the economic  threshold to  initiate  treatment programs  is  based  on determining
benefits  from control  relative  to control  costs,  allocative  efficiency  also  increases.  Even
though public benefits may be present (as they are for insured crops), it is not necessary  to
estimate them.  However, if public benefits are perceived to be important, public subsidiza-
tion of insurance premiums could easily be accommodated.
Summary and Conclusions
The existing grasshopper  control program has operated like a disaster relief program.  The
discrete economic threshold of 8 GH/YD2 is not sensitive  to rangeland productivity differ-
ences  and  economic  measures  of  (private)  benefits  relative  to  control  program  costs.
Administration of the publicly supported grasshopper control program results  in economic
inefficiencies  and distributional  inequities.
The agency which pays all of the costs of treating federal lands and cost shares with the
states  and private  lessees  on treating state  and  private  lands  faces  different  benefit/cost
measures than do the other landowner groups. Lessees of public land, who pay nothing for
treatment of grasshoppers  on these lands realize positive  benefits  from treatment of even
very low densities of grasshoppers.  Further,  ranchers who receive most of their rangeland
forage from public  lands receive more benefits from publicly financed grasshopper control
programs than do ranchers who rely mostly on private land for rangeland forage.
The  economic  efficiency  and  distributional  equity  of the existing  program  could be
improved if the grasshopper treatment program were designed as an insurance program. All
ranchers  leasing public land would be required to participate  in the grasshopper  insurance
program. In exchange for a small insurance premium per AUM of grazing land, the insurance
program  would  provide  control  of grasshoppers  once  they  reach  densities  above  the
financially  determined  economic  threshold.  Such a scheme  would  improve both the eco-
nomic efficiency  and  the  distributional  equity  relative  to  the existing  program.  Further,
insurance  financing  of rangeland  grasshopper  control  programs  will  help  protect  these
important  land  resources  in  the  face  of efforts  to  reduce  and  eliminate  public  resource
protection and subsidy programs.
[Received May 1995; final version received  August 1995.]
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